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Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the essential components in many Industrial Control 
Systems that control physical processes. However, in recent years the security flaws of these 
devices have come under scrutiny, particularly since the widely discussed Stuxnet attack. To help 
the industry state-of-the-art to move forward and to provide information required to improve the 
security for these controllers, this work investigates potential exploits of the Siemens S7-1211C 
controllers and the Totally Integrated Automation (TIA) engineering software. Using Windbg and 
Scapy, the anti-replay mechanism of the Siemens proprietary communication protocol, 
S7CommPlus, and the Profinet Discovery and Basic Configuration Protocol are found to be 
vulnerable. Attacks like session stealing, phantom PLC, cross connecting controllers and denial of 
S7 connections are demonstrated. The lack of authentication and consequent exploitation of the 
S7-ACK packet, an application layer packet for the S7CommPlus protocol, is highlighted as a key 
issue in this investigation. 
Keywords: Programmable Logic Controllers, PLC, cyber security  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial control systems (ICS) control important 
physical processes in critical infrastructures and 
various industrial environments. Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLC) are one of the most crucial 
components in many such systems, as PLCs are 
the point of interaction between the cyber and 
physical world. Well known previous attacks that 
targeted PLCs, like Stuxnet, have demonstrated 
the security challenges faced by these devices. 
The industry has since attempted to improve the 
security of PLCs but the impact of these measures 
is often not widely understood, despite various 
attacks that took place post-Stuxnet. Moreover, 
there is a relatively small amount of information 
available in the research community on the security 
of state-of-the-art PLCs, firmware and 
programming environments. Therefore, to help 
improve the security of PLCs, and thereby ICS 
more generally, a study has been done to 
understand the vulnerabilities of current generation 
PLC technologies. Various experiments and testing 
has been conducted, from manual testing to 
reverse engineering using different tools. This 
paper presents a number of possible exploits 
against PLCs that were discovered and discusses 
future work that can be done to enhance security in 
the area. As Siemens is one of the leading vendors 
in the industry, the widely used S7-1211C 
controller, was the focus of this investigation. The 
potential exploits of the software that is used to 
program Siemens PLCs, Totally Integrated 
Automation, or TIA portal, and the protocol used 
between them, S7CommPlus, have been 
addressed. A particular focus of the presented 
experiments is the S7-ACK packet, an 
acknowledgement packet in the application layer, 
on which multiple exploits are demonstrated to 
effect to the integrity and availability of the PLCs 
and TIA portal. The following section will document 
the background of PLCs, Siemens’ PLC 
ecosystems and other related research in the area. 
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
A PLC is a small industrial computer component 
used in ICSs to monitor and control physical 
processes. Generally, a PLC consists of several 
digital and analogue inputs and outputs, a 
processing unit, a memory module, and an 
interface to communicate with other devices in the 
network. Recent PLCs contain an Ethernet 
interface for communication. Custom logic is 
created by ICS operators via software, usually 
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proprietary to the hardware vendors, and can be 
uploaded to the PLCs through the Ethernet 
interface. A PLC program usually contains at least 
one organisation block and can include other 
function or data blocks. Each organisation block will 
be executed sequentially in a cycle. IEC 61131-3 
(International Electrotechnical Commission, 2013) 
specifies the basic programming element and 
languages that vendors usually expand on. 
Communication protocols like Modbus TCP and 
Profinet are used to enable transmission of data via 
Ethernet between devices. However, when the 
vendors’ proprietary software is used to configure 
or program a PLC, a proprietary protocol is 
generally used on top of the usual protocols.  
2.1. Siemens PLC Ecosystem 
Siemens PLCs can be programmed by TIA portal, 
which is the proprietary software developed by 
Siemens. The software can control, program or 
diagnose devices like PLCs, SCADA systems and 
Human-machine interfaces (HMI). Most 
communications that are initialised by TIA portal 
uses Siemens’ proprietary protocol, commonly 
known as the S7CommPlus protocol.  
There is a range of PLCs available from Siemens: 
S7-200, S7-300, S7-400, S7-1200 and S7-1500. 
The S7-200,300 and 400 PLCs are older PLCs that 
use the S7Comm protocol for communication 
without authentications. The S7-1200 PLC with 
firmware version 3 uses an older version of the 
S7CommPlus protocol, which adopts an anti-replay 
mechanism comprising only one anti-replay byte 
and a repeat of certain bytes for authentication. 
This work focuses on how TIA portal interacts with 
the S7-1211C PLCs with firmware version 4.1, 
which uses a newer version of the S7CommPlus 
protocol, the same as the S7-1500 PLCs. The 
S7CommPlus protocol runs on ISO on TCP 
(TPKT), and Connection Oriented Transport 
Protocol (COTP). There now follows a brief 
description of how an operator initialises a 
conversation with a PLC using TIA portal, and the 
way the S7CommPlus protocol works: 
(i) The operator searches the network 
interface for connected devices. 
(ii) TIA portal broadcasts a Profinet Discovery 
and Basic Configuration Protocol (PN-DCP) 
“Identify All” packet to the network. 
(iii) All Siemens PLCs or devices will reply to 
TIA portal with a “Identify OK” packet. 
(iv) TIA portal initialises TCP handshake with 
the PLC, and the PLC reply. 
(v) TIA portal and PLC exchange COTP 
packet. 
(vi) TIA portal sends the first S7 packet. 
(vii) PLC replies with a packet containing a one 
byte and a 20-byte anti-replay challenge 
(S7 Challenge). 
(viii) TIA portal replies with a packet containing 
an anti-replay byte and a 132-byte array, 
which is the anti-replay response (S7 
response). 
(ix) TIA portal sends packets with the action 
requested to the PLC, along with a 20-byte 
integrity check in every packet. 
 
Figure 1: The option in TIA portal to go online to a PLC 
If any S7CommPlus packets do not have correct 
anti-replay bytes or integrity check values, the other 
end of the connection will send a TCP reset packet 
and the session will be ended. By using TIA portal, 
the ICS operators can “go Online” to a PLC, as 
shown in Figure 1, which is the function in the TIA 
portal that allows the operator to connect to a PLC. 
An S7 session will be initiated and the operator can 
diagnose any problem related to the PLC, upload 
custom program, viewing real-time data from the 
PLC data blocks and configure communication 
between PLCs and other devices, etc. During the 
online period of the S7-1211C PLC, three packets 
are sent to the TIA portal during idle time specifying 
details and live status of the PLC, e.g. cycle time, 
memory usage etc. More information on the anti-
replay mechanism is detailed in Section 3. 
2.2. Related work 
There are a number of publications that are related 
to the vulnerabilities of PLCs. However, most of 
them are related to an older controller, older PLC 
firmware version, or make claims with few 
supporting details provided. A discussion of the 
most relevant modern publications is now 
presented. 
Lim et al. (2017) has documented an investigation 
on the Schneider Tricon PLC (Lim et al., 2017). 
Using reverse engineering techniques, the general 
structure of the Tricon communication protocol has 
been identified and an attack that involved 
recalculating packet length, CRC and checksum 
are demonstrated. This attack will lead to device 
failure that requires a reset of the Tricon PLC, 
which could cause significant problems in a real 
ICS environment.  
An SNMP scanner and a SOCKS proxy (Klick et 
al., 2015) on a Siemens S7-300 PLC was proven 
possible by inserting code in the beginning of a 
scan cycle of the PLCs, just like Stuxnet. This 
vulnerability introduces a network backdoor on 
which attackers could send packets into the 
network through an outward facing PLC. 
Password protection is usually provided by the 
vendors’ proprietary software to secure PLCs. 
However, it has been shown that password 
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stealing, password reset and memory control 
attacks (Wardak, Zhioua and Almulhem, 2016) are 
possible in a Siemens S7-400 PLCs by replay 
attacks. An older publication (Sandaruwan, 
Ranaweera and Oleshchuk, 2013) also 
demonstrated the possibility of replay attack, man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attack and authentication 
bypass attack. 
A recent publication (Lv et al., 2017) has proposed 
a way to decompile and map byte codes into PLC 
program instructions. This would allow an attacker 
to understand the details and processes that are 
running in an ICS. However, the PLC involved in 
the work is S7-200, which Siemens already listed 
as a phase-out product in 2013 (Industry Support 
Siemens, 2013).  
Regarding publications dedicated to newer PLCs, a 
PLC worm (Spenneberg, 2016) has been 
developed and demonstrated, whereby malicious 
code can potentially be inserted into PLCs, without 
human interaction. This attack exploits the 
vulnerabilities of Siemens’ proprietary protocol, 
S7CommPlus, used for the communication 
between TIA portal and the S7-1200 PLCs with 
firmware version 3. The information of the protocol 
architecture and processes for setting up PLC 
connections were also documented. 
Cheng et al. (2017) has provided information on the 
anti-replay mechanism that is used in the newest 
version of the S7CommPlus protocol, as used in 
the firmware version 4 of the S7-1200 PLC and the 
most advanced PLC, S7-1500 (Cheng, Donghong 
and Liang, 2017). By using reverse engineering 
techniques, the authors identified three encryption 
processes occurring during the authentication 
process of the S7 protocol. However, only sparse 
details were provided on these three encryptions. 
Communicate 
using 
S7CommPlus
TIA portal Siemens PLC  
Figure 2: The three targeted element in the Siemens 
Ecosystem 
2.3. Motivation 
To the best knowledge of the authors, the 
information available in the research community 
related to the vulnerabilities and exploits of the 
PLCs are outdated or limited, although it is worth 
highlighting that this information is still relevant to 
current ICSs due to the long life-cycle of PLCs. As 
part of a broader program of research, the authors 
have been investigating in detail the anti-replay 
mechanism and surrounding processes used in the 
newest S7CommPlus protocol. During the initial 
phases of this investigation, a number of interesting 
security issues have emerged that will now be 
presented. There are some intrusion detection 
mechanisms proposed that have the ability to 
monitor S7-1200 traffics (Jardine et al., 2016; Fauri 
et al., 2017; Kreimel, Eigner and Tavolato, 2017), 
however, these works are also based on the older 
Siemens controller firmware and communication 
protocol. This paper therefore provides the 
information on the discovered vulnerabilities in the 
latest Siemens PLC ecosystems and how these 
may be exploited. The security issues for modern, 
state-of-the-art PLCs, beyond those identified in 
Section 2.2 are being addressed.  
TIA portal PLC
Compromised 
machine
ARP 
poisoning
Packet 
dropped
Stolen 
Session
Intended 
connection
Actual 
connection
 
Figure 3: Online session stealing attack 
3. VULNERABILITY AND EXPLOIT 
This work only utilises well-known tools, like Scapy 
and Windbg, and information that is openly 
available via the internet. Competent attackers 
could easily obtain such information, especially if 
equipped with sufficient domain knowledge. The 
experiment was done in a testbed containing a 
switch, which connects two S7-1211C PLCs with 
firmware version v4.1, an engineering station and a 
“compromised” machine. TIA portal v14 is running 
in the engineering station. 
Different vendors have different proprietary 
software and protocols which are responsible to 
perform or enable important controls of PLCs. 
Therefore the interaction between the three 
elements, as shown in Figure 2, are the prime 
target of this work. The flaw in the PN-DCP 
exchange, and the anti-replay mechanism enable 
most of the following exploits. It is important to 
mentioned that each vulnerabilities or potential 
exploits alone might not cause damage or 
disruption to the services of the connected ICS, 
however it may be the case that an enterprising 
attacker could combine any of the discovered 
issues as part of a broader series of impactful 
exploits.  
3.1. Online session stealing 
Operators can “go Online” to a PLC using TIA 
portal to control, diagnose, or upload custom logic 
to the PLCs. In order to send an S7 packet to 
perform a legitimate function in TIA portal, a 20-
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byte integrity check must be calculated for every 
packet. However, it was discovered once a 
connection has been established, in order to stay 
connected to a PLC, a simple reply, with the byte 
“03 00 00 07 02 f0 00” (namely “S7-ACK” for the 
rest of this paper), to any packet sent by the PLC 
will allow the session to stay alive. Given that The 
S7-ACK packet is only a 7-byte packet, which lacks 
the 20-byte integrity check, and given the S7-
1211C PLC only allow one S7 session in any given 
moment, one of the possible ways to exploit the 
S7-ACK is to steal the session between a TIA 
portal and a PLC. There are other ways on 
hijacking a session but for this work it is achieved 
by using MITM attack, by ARP poisoning for 
example, as illustrated by Figure 3. A Scapy script 
was developed to demonstrate it is possible to 
perform this attack both actively or passively. For 
active session stealing, the attacker can simply 
drop all the packets from the TIA portal and reply to 
any packet sent by the PLC with the S7-ACK 
packet. As the PLC only sent three packets during 
an idle session with no request to TIA portal, the 
S7-ACK packet would be enough to keep the 
session alive. On the other hand, passive session 
stealing looks for five, or sometimes four, packets 
that the TIA portal sent when the ICS operators “go 
Offline” to the PLC. The script would drop all these 
packets and send the S7-ACK instead – during 
which time the operator thinks TIA portal has gone 
offline. For both attacks, if the operators attempt to 
connect again, the PLC will reject the legitimate 
traffic from TIA portal and the operator would not 
be able to control the PLC as normal. Figure 4 
shows the information from the PLC obtained by 
TIA portal after the attack was executed.  
 
Figure 4: TIA portal before and after session being 
stolen. 
3.2. Phantom PLC 
It is possible to show the ICS operator a PLC that 
does not exist. Figure 5 shows “phantom_1” appear 
in the list of accessible devices in TIA portal.  
 
Figure 5: The Phantom PLC appears in the list of the 
accessible devices. 
It is achieved by exploiting the PN-DCP protocol in 
the data link layer. PN-DCP is part of Profinet that 
is used for device discovery and identification, or to 
configure the device name and IP addresses. 
When the operator requests the list of accessible 
devices, the TIA portal will broadcast an “Identify 
All” packet to the mac address “01:0e:cf:00:00:00” 
and all Siemens PLCs will reply with an “Identify 
OK” packet. The payload of the PN-DCP “Identify 
OK” packet usually contains the name, IP address, 
subnet and gateway of a PLC. A special packet is 
crafted, and attacker could listen to the network 
and inject this packet to the network once the 
“Identify ALL” packet is broadcasted in the network. 
The impact of this exploit is limited, but it is 
possible to combine with other exploits, like cross 
connecting PLCs, to increase the chances of 
human error and causes misconfiguration of PLCs.  
TIA portal
PLC1
PLC2
Compromised 
machine
ARP 
poisoning
Intended 
connection
Actual 
connection
 
Figure 6: Cross connecting PLC attack 
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3.3. Cross connecting PLC 
After the “Identify All” packet, a list of PLCs 
connected to the network are shown in the TIA 
portal. The operator can now access the 
information from the specific PLC in the network, 
for example “plc_1” with the IP address 
“168.168.1.120” in Figure 5. As mentioned in 
Session 2.1, the TIA portal will initiate a TCP 
session with the PLC. If an attacker performs a 
MITM attack between the TIA portal and PLCs, it is 
possible to redirect the TCP connection from 
“plc_1” to “plc_2”, while the ICS operator would still 
think the TIA portal is connected to “plc_1”. The 
operator may continue to configure and upload 
logic to “plc_1” but in fact the logic in “plc_2” would 
be changed instead, as shown in Figure 6. This 
could cause obvious significant failures in the 
relevant ICS. However, the operator could 
potentially spot abnormal information shown in TIA 
portal. As shown in Figure 7, there are differences 
in the IP address of the PLC that are shown in 
different pane of the UI in the TIA portal. In normal 
operations, it may be difficult to spot these 
differences as the IP address of “plc_2” is only 
shown if the operators explicitly check the detail of 
the Profinet interface, which is not required during 
normal operations. The different IP addresses are 
caused by different panes reading the same 
information from different sources; one IP address 
is read from the PN-DCP packet, while the other is 
from the S7CommPlus packet. It is possible to 
amend the S7CommPlus packet and the 
corresponding integrity check bytes to further 
disguise the attack. 
 
Figure 7: Different IP addresses are shown in TIA portal. 
3.4. DoS on S7 Communication 
From the result of the authors’ parallel research, it 
is possible to generate a S7CommPlus response 
packet with the correct anti-replay byte. The 
highlighted bytes in Figure 8 are the 132-byte array 
that changes every time a session is created. The 
two 16-byte values that are in the rectangles are 
the two anti-replay responses generated by two 
different encryption of the anti-replay mechanism 
first mentioned by Cheng et al. (Cheng, Donghong 
and Liang, 2017). A python script has been 
developed and the script can initialise an S7 
session with the correct S7CommPlus response 
value to a PLC. However, instead of continuing the 
session by sending packets including control 
information, a S7-ACK packet is sent each time the 
PLC send a packet to the “TIA portal”. As 
mentioned in Session 3.1, if there is an active S7 
session ongoing in the PLC, any legitimate TIA 
portal connection will be rejected. Although the 
affected PLC will continue its pre-programmed 
logic, there is no way to stop, re-configure or re-
program that PLC, which could be critical on its 
own, or contribute to causing problems as part of a 
wider attack scenario. The S7 session can be 
stopped if the operator manually restarts the PLC, 
however the compromised machine in the network 
can simply initiate another connection before a 
legitimate request could be made after the restart. 
Figure 9 shows the error message displayed in the 
TIA portal if the operators attempt to connect to a 
PLC from a project that the operator created. This 
attack does not require the use of ARP poisoning 
and only uses a legitimate S7CommPlus 
connection. 
 
Figure 8: 132-byte anti-replay array with two encryptions 
3.5. A COMBINED ATTACK 
As mentioned above, an attacker could potentially 
combine any of these discoveries to cause a threat 
that is more difficult to be mitigated. For example, 
an attacker may start by initiating a session stealing 
attack as documented in section 3.1. However, TIA 
portal or the PLC will occasionally send a new ARP 
request. As the exploit is based on the MITM attack 
with ARP poisoning, an excessive use of ARP 
packet is required throughout the session to 
overwhelm the legitimate ARP request, which might 
draw attentions from the operators. Instead, when 
the attacker successfully steals the session and 
rejects the communication from the legitimate TIA 
portal, to achieve the same goal on keeping the 
session alive, the exploit documented in section 3.4 
can be utilized. The stolen session can be 
terminated immediately, and a new S7CommPlus 
connection can be initiated, as demonstrated in 
Figure 10. This combined attack generates a much 
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smaller “footprint” in the network while the same 
goal is achieved to deny operators to go online to a 
PLC. Meanwhile it will be harder to detect or 
mitigate the threat when compared to the bare 
session stealing attack. This is just one of the 
possible attacks that involved the above exploits. In 
addition, if an attacker can obtain the information 
about the anti-replay mechanism and the 20-byte 
integrity check, which appears possible through 
reverse engineering, the possibility of the attacker 
to successfully execute an impactful attack after 
gaining access to the ICS network cannot be 
overlooked. 
 
Figure 9: PLC rejecting legitimate TIA portal connection 
4. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
All of the presented attacks require access to the ICS 
process control network. However, as demonstrated by 
Stuxnet and the Ukraine electric grid attacks, 
sophisticated attackers can eventually get access to such 
networks. Therefore, the traditionally “air-gapped” 
process control network will only provide a false sense 
of security to the operators. It is demonstrated that, by 
using various means, system operators may be 
misdirected towards configuring the incorrect PLC, or 
may be prohibited to connect to the PLCs using the TIA 
portal. The impact of such attacks would depend on the 
specific ICS, but a disruption of physical processes is a 
possible consequence. Network security measures, like 
firewalls and intrusion detection systems, could prevent 
some of the exploits mentioned in this paper, for 
example, detecting excessive or unknown ARP packets. 
However, exploits that utilise legitimate functionality, 
like the one mentioned in section 
 
Figure 7: Different IP addresses are shown in TIA portal. 
3.4 on an infected engineering station in the 
network, would still be successful since these 
communications cannot be blocked due to the 
genuine controls that TIA portal requires. An 
operator will not be able to connect to the affected 
devices and the compromised machine could 
initiate another session even if the PLC has been 
manually reset. Moreover, it was found that the S7-
ACK packet, which does not require integrity or 
authentication details in the packet, has the 
potential to be exploited. A potential mitigation 
would be a firmware update of the PLCs, on which 
PLCs will disconnect any idle S7 session after 
certain period of time. However, if the attacker has 
the ability to replay packets with the correct anti-
replay and integrity bytes, legitimate S7 connection 
could still be rejected if a new connection is 
initiated after the time-out.  
Future work will include gathering more information 
on the features and vulnerabilities of the 
S7CommPlus protocol and similar protocols from 
different vendors. An investigation on how these 
vulnerabilities can be exploited will also be 
performed, especially those obtained from analysis 
of the TIA portal. Besides, the authors believe there 
are other ways to exploits the PN-DCP protocol, 
similar to a CVE that was recently published that 
affected most Siemens PLCs (Information 
Technology Laboratory, 2018).  
A study will also be done on identifying ways to 
improve the security of the control systems. One 
potential way is to develop a realistic honeypot. 
The honeypot can, either actively (sniffing the 
network) or passively (waiting for a connection) 
identify whether a connection is from a legitimate 
TIA portal or an attacker’s attempt to exploit 
legitimate functionalities. Ironically, most of the 
exploits mentioned in this paper, e.g. the phantom 
PLC, and the information obtained by reverse 
engineering the TIA portal is essential for creating a 
honeypot that behaves like a legitimate PLC. 
Furthermore, it would be beneficial for the industry 
to have an improved standard on the 
communication protocol that is responsible for the 
connection between engineering software and 
PLCs.  
TIA portal PLC
Compromised 
machine
ARP 
poisoning
Packet 
dropped
Stolen 
Session
Intended 
connection
Actual 
connection
“Legitimate” 
S7 Session
 
Figure 10: Session stealing with “legitimate” S7 session 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This work presented several ways of exploiting the 
Siemens S7-1211C PLC, the proprietary protocol, 
and software, by using simple tools like Windbg 
and Scapy. Session stealing, phantom PLC, cross 
connecting PLCs and DoS of S7 communication 
has been demonstrated. Experiments have been 
carried out using the most current suite of PLC 
devices and software available, thus going beyond 
many published works that investigate now 
outdated technologies, e.g. the worm that can 
spread among PLCs (Spenneberg, 2016) and byte 
code de-compilation (Lv et al., 2017). The exploits 
in this paper are not complicated in their own right 
but provide an overview on what can be done using 
only legitimate functionalities of the engineering 
software. In particular, the potential exploit of the 
S7-ACK packet has been uncovered in this work. 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that general 
network security measures would be beneficial but 
not sufficient, especially if the attack involves the 
exploitation of legitimate functionalities. Potential 
mitigation like disconnecting idle S7 session will 
only have limited effect. Therefore, research has to 
be done on proposing a better way on securing the 
PLCs, including to improve the anti-replay 
mechanism and integrity check, and the ability to 
differentiate between malicious and legitimate 
session. 
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